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societal repression was an early priority.1	In	a	similar	vein,	the	feminist	agenda	has	
also	prioritized	exploring	 the	 relationship	of	gender	 to	 truth-telling,	 to	amnesty,	
and	 to	 peacemaking.	 More	 recently,	 efforts	 to	 engender	 reparations	 programs	
have	brought	light	and	heat	to	a	range	of	harms	experienced	by	women	that	were	
typically	ignored	in	prior	programs,	including	loss	of	the	capacity	to	bear	children	
or	the	costs	of	bearing	children	born	of	sexual	violation.2 There have been efforts to 
bring	a	range	of	non-physical	harms,	such	as	familial	separation	or	forced	nudity,	
within the universe of harms captured by transitional justice.3	Increasing	feminist	
attention	 to	 the	 category	 of	 socioeconomic	 harms	 and	 their	 disproportionate	
impact on women is also a feature of contemporary analysis.4	Feminist	critique	





of which harms are visible to transitional justice and which are left untouched has 
been	one	of	the	central	feminist	contributions	to	the	field.	
By	contrast,	feminist	interventions	have	assumed	a	remarkably	narrow	set	
of actors and institutions of responsibility. Many devices common to the transi-
tional	justice	landscape—amnesty,	truth-recovery,	international	criminal	justice,	
1 See Kelly dawn asKIn, war CrImes aGaInst women proseCutIon In InternatIonal war CrImes 
(1997);	Françoise	Krill,	The Protection of Women in International Humanitarian Law,	249	Int’l 
reV. red Cross 337	(1985).
2	 Ruth	 Rubio-Marin,	 The Gender of Reparations in Transitional Societies,	 in the Gender of 
reparatIons: unsettlInG sexual hIerarChIes whIle redressInG human rIGhts VIolatIons 
63	 (Ruth	Rubio-Marin	ed.,	2009);	see also	Colleen	Duggan,	Claudia	Paz	y	Paz	Bailey	&	Julie	
Guillerot,	Reparations for Sexual and Reproductive Violence: Prospects for Achieving Gender 
Justice in Guatemala and Peru,	2	Int’l J. transItIonal Just. 192,	200-01	(2008).
3	 Fionnuala	Ní	Aoláin,	Sex-Based Violence and the Holocaust: A Reevaluation of Harms and Rights 










state; the state is seen as the locus for reform and the entity that is most capable 





tions assume a functional state as the sine qua non for successful transition as 










and	 conflict-ending	 processes	 on	 that	 basis.	 The	 imposition	 of	 legal	 norms	 in	
such	 situations	may	 depend	 on	 an	 inconsistent	 or	 downgraded	matrix	 of	 state	
enforcement in competition or in parallel with appropriation of law or force norms 









committed by non-state actors.
This	 chapter	 interrogates	 the	 framework	 provided	 by	 international	 law5 
for	 addressing	 the	 gendered	 violence	 of	 non-state	 actors	 and	 is	 intended	 as	










Part	 I	 will	 offer	 a	 brief	 introduction	 to	 the	 gendered	 gaps	 of	 negotiated	
transition with non-state actors and present the Colombian case as exemplary. 
In	Part	 II	we	consider	 the	general	 regime	of	accountability	under	 international	
humanitarian law and focus on how commitments to minimum humanitarian 
standards	 might	 bring	 greater	 accountability	 measures	 for	 ongoing	 acts	 of	
violence	against	women	perpetrated	by	guerrilla	groups	when	the	application	of	
international	humanitarian	law	is	contested.	Part	III	then	deals	with	imputed	state	
liability for the violence of non-state actors. We focus on the persistent violence of 
the	non-state	groups	in	internal	armed	conflict	situations—particularly	violence	
experienced	disproportionately	by	women—and	identify	the	attendant	complexity	
of	 holding	 such	 groups	 and	 individuals	 accountable	 during	 transition.	 This	
section	concludes	by	examining	how	the	horizontal	application	of	human	rights	
obligations	can	be	more	effectively	exploited	 to	 secure	 state	accountability	 for	
multiple	forms	of	violence	against	women	within	demilitarization	zones.
 
I.  Gendered Dimensions of Negotiated Transition 
For a more considered appreciation of the capacity and limitations of the 
state,	it	is	important	to	focus	on	one	foundational	aspect	of	the	liberal	(democratic)	
state,	 and	 a	 vision	 that	 undergirds	 the	 “from”	 and	 “to”	 of	 many	 transitional	
contexts—namely	 the	 public/private	 distinction.	 The	 delineation	 of	 public	 and	
private	harms	in	transitional	justice	discourse	draws	on	a	long	genealogy	of	public	
and	private	spheres	in	liberal	political	discourse	and	is	critical	to	the	structuring	
of political transformation. This distinction has had important implications for 
the	types	of	harms	retrospectively	identified	in	transitional	justice	accounting.	In	
contexts	where	transitional	 justice	is	 instituted	in	 the	midst	of	ongoing	conflict,	
gendered	distinctions	around	public	and	private	harms	are	embedded	in	the	political	






communal	 violence	 between	 (generally)	 male	 combatants.6	 Paradigmatically	










are	 rewarded	 by	 remaking	 the	 state	 and	 its	 structures	 in	ways	 that	 bring	 non-
state	actors,	whose	support	is	deemed	indispensable	and	must	therefore	be	earned,	
into the mainstream. The violence of course invariably involves harms directed 
towards	women.	Hence,	the	“deal”	is	often	a	deal	for	boys	and	not	for	girls,	as	a	
matter both of substance and representation. 
These	 two	 realities—the	 gendered	 categorization	 of	 public/private	 harms	
and	the	enduring	influence	of	the	non-state	actor	in	transition—combine	to	create	
a particularly precarious security situation for women in contexts of limited or 
fractured state capacity. While the peace deal may transform relations between 
violent	 (generally	male)	 actors,	 it	will	 likely	 do	 very	 little	 to	 transform	 social	
relations	within	zones	geographically	and	politically	controlled	by	violent	non-
state	actors.	Further,	 the	political	 compromise	at	 the	heart	of	 the	peace	deal	 is	
based on a clear hierarchy of public over private harms. 
Such	observations	suggest	a	need	to	interrogate	the	composition,	capacity,	
and	accountability	of	the	state	in	transition.	Given	the	enduring	influence	of	the	
non-state	 actor,	 re-establishing	 the	 state’s	monopoly	 on	 coercion	 is	 secured	 in	
practice	by	bringing	the	non-state	actor	within	 the	state.	The	boundaries	of	 the	
state	 are	 therefore	 negotiated	 and	negotiable.	The	 state’s	malleable	 boundaries	
create	accountability	gaps	as	a	matter	of	principle	and	practice	 in	 international	
law,	which	 chiefly	posits	 the	 state	 as	 the	 site	 and	conduit	 of	 accountability.	 In	
general,	across	the	two	most	relevant	international	legal	frameworks	in	transitional	
settings—human	 rights	 law	 and	 international	 humanitarian	 law	 (IHL)7—there	
is	a	regulatory	gap	or	at	 least	a	slimmer	body	of	norms	that	apply	to	non-state	
actors	 than	 to	 state	actors.	 In	most	 functional	 societies,	 this	accountability	gap	
between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 non-state	 actor,	 while	 not	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 general	
efficiency	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 (and	 with	 substantial	 consequences	 for	 women),	
does	not	 create	 a	massive	 lacuna	 in	 legal	 regulation.	The	 same	cannot	be	 said	
of	 transitional	 societies.	 In	 these	 societies,	 precisely	 because	 the	 local	 rule	 of	
law	may	be	compromised	or	degraded	and	enforcement	of	“ordinary”	rules	may	
be	 limited,	 international	 legal	norms	are	 frequently	called	upon	 to	fill	 the	gap.	
7	 We	note	that	as	Colombia	ratified	the	Rome	Statute	in	2002,	though	exercising	its	discretion	under	
article	124	of	the	Statute	to	postpone	for	seven	years	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Court	over	war	crimes	






and in our view under-appreciated. 
The	Colombian	case	is	paradigmatic	of	such	dilemmas	and	gaps.	Six	decades	








alienation from the State. The multiplicity of violent state and non-state actors 
poses	 particular	 challenges	 to	 securing	 accountability	 for	 violence	 against	
women,	a	form	of	violence	that	has	traditionally	eluded	accountability	even	in	
settled states. 












Below	 we	 discuss	 expanding	 and	 capitalizing	 on	 humanitarian	 law’s	
capture	 of	 the	 non-state	 actor,	 the	 first	 of	 our	 two	 suggested	 areas	 for	
improvement.
II.  Humanitarian Law Accountability and Minimum Humanitarian 














It	 is	 generally	understood	 that	 the	 experience	of	 and	 fall-out	 from	violent	
conflict	 is	 particularly	 extreme	 for	many	women.8	There	 are	 numerous	 conflict	
harms	 that	 are	 suffered	 disproportionately	 or	 exclusively	 by	women,	 including	















rather	 these	armed	groups	settle	 their	 scores	by	attacking	civilians	suspected	of	
supporting	the	other	side.	Although	men	are	the	most	common	victims	of	summary	
8 See generally the aftermath: women In post-ConflICt transformatIon	 (Sheila	 Meintjes,	
Meredeth	Turshen	&	Anu	Pillay	eds.,	2002).
9 See, e.g.,	women In an InseCure world: VIolenCe aGaInst women faCts, fIGures and analysIs 
(Marie	Vlachova	&	Lea	Biason	eds.,	2005).
10	 Secretary-General,	Report of the Secretary-General on Advancement of Women: In-depth study 
on All Forms of Violence against Women,	U.N.	Doc.	A/61/122/Add.1	(6	July	2006);	Elizabeth	Rehn	
&	Ellen	Johnson	Sirleaf,	UNIFEM,	Progress	of	the	World’s	Women	Series,	Vol.	1,	Women, War, 
Peace: The Independent Experts’ Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and 
Women’s Role in Peace Building	(2002).
11	 UN	 Special	 Rapporteur	 on	 Violence	 against	Women	 Radhika	 Coomaraswamy,	Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Submitted in 















paramilitary	 forces	suffer	 sexual	abuse	and	 infringements	of	 their	 reproductive	
rights.	Forced	contraception,	sterilization,	and	abortion	are	particularly	associated	
with	guerilla	groups.16 
Both	 groups	 are	 responsible	 for	 forcible	 displacement	 of	 civilian	
communities.	 Colombia	 has	 the	 largest	 internally	 displaced	 population	 in	 the	
western	hemisphere,	currently	estimated	at	over	3.5	million	people.	The	majority	
of	 the	displaced	 are	 female.	These	women	and	girls	 are	 subjected	 to	manifold	
forms	of	violence.	Internally	displaced	women	are	at	much	greater	risk	of	sexual	
abuse,	rape,	and	being	forced	into	prostitution	because	of	their	particular	social	
and economic vulnerability.17 
2.		Humanitarian	 Law’s	 Treatment	 of	 the	Non-State	Actor	 and	Gender	
Harms
In	contrast	to	this	myriad	of	violent	harms	perpetrated	against	Colombian	




state	 actors	 with	 evident	 seepage	 to	 accountability.	 International	 legal	 norms,	





15 Id. at 14.














of civilians and hors de combat,	viewing	the	state	as	the	primary	source	of	threat	
to	 the	 safety	 and	 integrity	 of	 such	 vulnerable	 groups.21	 By	 1979,	 through	 the	
Additional	Protocols	to	the	Geneva	Conventions,	States	agreed	that	certain	non-





groupings.	Protocol	 II	Additional	 to	 the	Geneva	Conventions	of	1979	expands	
the	accountability	orbit	by	regulating	a	wider	range	of	internal	conflicts,	but	on	
more limited terms.23	As	a	 result	humanitarian	 law	has	 the	capacity	 to	directly	
18	 International	Covenant	on	Civil	 and	Political	Rights,	Dec.	19,	1966,	999	U.N.T.S.	171,	entered 




19 See Oren	Gross,	The Grave Breaches System and the Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia,	16	
mICh. J. Int’l l. 783	(1995).
20 See J. l. brIerly, the law of natIons	49-56	(6th	ed.,	1978).
21 frItz KahlshoVen & lIesbeth zeGVeld, ICrC, ConstraInts on the waGInG of war: an 
IntroduCtIon to InternatIonal humanItarIan law (2001),	available at	http://www.icrc.org/web/
eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/p0793.
22	 Protocol	1	Article	1	on	 the	General	principles	and	 scope	of	application	 refers	 to	 those	“armed	
conflicts	 in	 which	 peoples	 are	 fighting	 against	 colonial	 domination	 and	 alien	 occupation	 and	






and	 dissident	 armed	 forces	 or	 other	 organized	 armed	 groups	 which,	 under	
responsible	 command,	 exercise	 such	 control	 over	 a	 part	 of	 its	 territory	 as	 to	
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to 
implement	this	Protocol.	















address accountability.25	This	would	 create	 an	 agreed	 ethical	 and	 legal	 context	
in	which	breaches	would	be	understood	as	legal	violations	potentially	subject	to	
sanction.	As	The Roots of Behaviour in War, an	authoritative	ICRC	study,	affirms,	




We	endorse	 the	principle	 that	creating	greater	 leverage	requiring	states	 to	
affirm	the	applicability	of	IHL	is	a	sensible	and	important	mechanism	to	this	end.	
In	 tandem	we	 also	 support	 greater	 efforts	 to	 encourage	non-state	 groupings	 to	






women’s	 experiences	 of	 harm	 in	 internal	 conflict.	 In	 general,	 IHL’s	 historical	
neglect	of	harms	experienced	by	women	points	to	deep	and	gendered	biases	in	the	





25	 This	 speculation	 is	 largely	 theoretical	 in	 that	 few	 situations	 of	 internal	 armed	 conflict	 have	
applied	such	norms	and	little	or	no	accountability	has	been	sought	in	terms	of	either	domestic	or	
international	legal	process.
26 ICrC, the roots of behaVIour In war: understandInG and preVentInG Ihl VIolatIons	(2004).
27 See	Judith	Gardham,	Women and Armed Conflict: The Response of International Humanitarian 

























These	dynamics	apply	directly	 to	 the	Colombian	context,	where	 the	 state	
has	 long-resisted	 the	 application	 of	 IHL.	 Given	 that	 the	 historic	 roots	 of	 the	
conflict31	precede	the	negotiation	of	the	Geneva	Conventions,	and	more	relevantly	
perhaps	 the	Additional	Protocols,	 the	 regulatory	 capacity	of	 IHL	has	had	 little	
to	 say	about	 (and/or	has	not	deployed	 to	address)	 the	historic	 roots	of	 conflict	




29	 The	 1977	Diplomatic	Conference	 expanding	 the	 protections	 of	 the	 laws	 of	war	 to	 enumerated	
internal	conflicts	evidenced	preoccupation	with	the	fertile	and	expectant	woman.	The	Conference	
acknowledged	 that	 women	 had	 to	 be	 given	 “special	 protection”	 because	 of	 their	 “special	





than	 a	 crime	 against	 “honor.”	 This	 article	 also	 recognized	 the	 particular	 experience	 of	 forced	
prostitution	by	specifically	including	its	prohibition.	The	Diplomatic	Conference	gave	little	of	its	










Presidential	 peace	 initiatives	 in	 the	 early	 1990s	 led	 to	 the	 ratification	 of	
Protocol	II	to	the	Geneva	Conventions	in	1995	as	part	of	a	larger	scheme	to	recognize	
and	address	 the	political	grievances	of	 the	guerrilla	 insurgents.	 In	practice,	 the	
State’s	commitment	to	the	application	of	Protocol	II	to	the	guerrilla	groups	has	
waxed	and	waned,	in	accordance	with	the	faltering	progress	of	successive	peace	
initiatives.	The	Uribe	 administration	 insists	 that	 the	 conflict	 does	not	meet	 the	
threshold	of	violence	required	to	engage	Protocol	II32 (which is consistent with the 
practice	of	other	states	faced	with	internal	insurgencies	and/or	non-state	collective	
violence).	Nonetheless,	it	is	helpful	that	the	treaty	framework	includes	Protocol	
II.	Recognition	 leaves	 space	 for	 interaction	 through	 the	 discourse	 provided	by	
IHL	norms	on	accountability	and	provides	a	normative	frame	of	reference	for	the	
violations committed.
In	 terms	 of	 sex-based	 violence,	 the	 potential	 applicability	 of	 Protocol	 II	
is	 important.	Protocol	II	 includes	in	its	provision	of	Fundamental	Guarantees	a	
prohibition	 on	 rape.	Relevant	 also	 is	 that	 in	December	 1992,	 the	 International	
Committee	 for	 the	 Red	 Cross,	 declared	 that	 the	 provisions	 of	Article	 147	 on	
grave	breaches	of	the	Geneva	Conventions	included	rape.33	This	gives	some	point	
of	 regulatory	 entry	 to	 address	 the	 sexual	 violations	 experienced	 by	women	 in	
Colombia	through	the	legal	prism	of	Protocol	II.
However,	 state	 reluctance	 to	 concede	 the	 application	 of	 IHL	means	 that	
a	 criminalization	model	 is	 frequently	 applied	 (albeit	with	great	 tension)	 to	 the	
actions	of	 the	non-state	actor.	Such	a	model	generally	struggles	 to	be	effective	
given	 ongoing	 competition	 over	 territory,	 legitimacy,	 and	 control	 of	 political	
space.	A	criminalization	model	generally	fails	to	create	any	political	acceptance	
or	accommodation	of	the	genuine	issues	of	political	and	territorial	dispute	that	are	






of	 violence	 against	women.	 Local	women’s	 organizations	 continue	 to	 identify	
manifold	and	systemic	shortcomings	in	the	criminal	justice	system,	ranging	from	
attitudinal	problems	of	staff	who	fail	to	acknowledge	violence	against	women	as	
32 See generally	Mikro	Sossai,	The Internal Conflict in Colombia and the Fight Against Terrorism: 
UN Security Council Resolution 1465 (2003) and Further Developments,	3	J. Int’l CrIm. Just. 
253	(2005).
33	 International	Committee	of	the	Red	Cross,	Aide-mémoire on Provision of Article 147	(Dec.	1992).
34 See generally	Special	Rapporteur:	Mission	to	Colombia,	supra note 11. 
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a	serious	social	harm,	and	technical	issues	around	the	prosecutors’	treatment	and	
use of evidence of sexual violence.35 Even if the criminal system were capable 
of	 addressing	 cases	 of	 violence	 against	women	 efficiently,	 individual	 cases	 in	
ordinary jurisdiction would not necessarily serve to expose the systematic and 




of	IHL	to	the	Colombian	conflict.	In	1995,	the	Ejército de Liberación Nacional 
(ELN)	 declared	 that	 it	 considered	 itself	 to	 be	 bound	 by	 the	 1949	 Geneva	
Conventions	and	Additional	Protocol	II,36 around the same time that the Fuerzas 




Liberation	 Organization	 have	made	 such	 declarations	 in	 the	 past.38 The value 
of	such	affirmations	does	not	lie	in	their	formal	legal	effect	because	only	states	




capacity	exists	within	a	non-state	organization	 to	enforce	 the	provisions	of	 the	
Geneva	Conventions	and	Additional	Protocols.	Second,	at	least	in	theory,	it	holds	







Geneva	 Conventions]	 ‘open	 to	 interpretation.’”39	 Further,	 there	 is	 compelling	
35	 See,	for	example,	CorporaCIón humanas, serIe aCCeso a la JustICIa, la sItuaCIón de las muJeres 
VíCtImas de VIolenCIas de Género en el sIstema penal aCusatorIo (2008); CorporaCIón sIsma 
muJer, entre el ConflICto armado y las reformas a la JustICIa, ColombIa 2001-2004 (2005).
36 human rIGhts watCh, war wIthout Quarter: ColombIa and InternatIonal humanItarIan law 
(1998)	(citing	Letter	from	Manuel	Pérez,	released	to	the	press	on	July	15,	1995).	




38 See generally	Noelle	Higgins,	The Application of International Humanitarian Law to Wars of National 
Liberation,	Journal of humanItarIan assIstanCe	(Apr.	2004),	http://www.jha.ac/articles/a132.pdf.













 B. Proposed Areas for Feminist Intervention
In	 light	 of	 the	 current	 panorama	 described	 above,	 we	 now	 propose	 three	
potential	 areas	 for	 feminist	 interventions	 to	 improve	 the	 use	 of	 IHL	 norms	 to	
increase	accountability	for	and	protection	from	gendered	harms:	(1)	advocacy	for	





Another	 related	 and	 controversial	 issue	 is	 the	 definition	 of	 subject	 in	 the	
field	 of	 humanitarian	 law.	Humanitarian	 law	 requires	 a	 sufficient	 threshold	 of	
violence	to	be	activated,42	a	control	of	territory	requirement,	and	other	measures	
of	the	degree	of	organization	(command	and	control	responsibility	sufficient	to	
disseminate	 international	 humanitarian	 law)	 sufficient	 to	 don	 the	 privilege	 of	
combatant (and also prisoner of war) status. When these thresholds tests were 
conceived,	whether	 in	 the	 post-World	War	 II	 period	 or	 the	 decolonization	 and	
Cold	War	context	of	the	late	1970s,	particular	conceptions	of	conflict	were	in	play.	
Concretely,	the	rules	responded	to	the	conflicts	of	the	time.	In	many	conflicts	the	
40 See generally human rIGhts watCh, supra note 36; human rIGhts watCh, beyond neGotIatIon: 
InternatIonal humanItarIan law and Its applICatIon to the ConduCt of the farC-ep	(2001).






organized	 armed	 groups	 which,	 under	 responsible	 command,	 exercise	 such	






also	 ill-equipped	 to	 address	 the	 forms	 of	 violence	 in	 which	 targeting	 women	
constitutes	a	specific	method	and	means	of	warfare.	
The	proliferation	of	armed	groups	has	characterized	the	Colombian	conflict:	
innumerable	 and	 overlapping	 guerrilla,	 paramilitary	 “self-defense”,	 and	 narco-
trafficking	 groups.	 It	may	 be	 that	 the	 threshold	 of	 violence	 sufficient	 to	 activate	
humanitarian	law	application	requires	greater	contemporary	contextualization—for	
example multiple and splintered violent actors in sum rather than the measure of 
one	 group’s	 effect	 on	 overall	 violence.43	Alternatively,	 the	 threshold	 of	 violence	
measure	 could	 be	 horizontally	 calibrated	 over	 time	 as	 a	 cumulative	 test,	 rather	
than	a	vertical	test	in	which	a	conflict	has	to	satisfy	a	threshold	test	at	a	particular	







We	note	 that,	 in	 a	 non-judicial	 context,	 a	 deeper	 accounting	 of	 gendered	




investigation.	Thus	 in	 its	 report	 on	 the	massacres	 experienced	 by	 the	 town	 of	
Trujillo,	 the	 terms	“before”	 and	 “after”	 the	massacres	 are	 acknowledged	 to	be	
misleading	terms	when	one	considers	that	gender-based	violence	pervades	normal	
life in the town.44	 In	 the	 section	 dealing	with	 the	memories	 of	women	 victim	
survivors,	the	report	brings	out	women’s	gender-specific	experiences	of	violence	
and	discrimination	within	families	in	the	area,	concluding	that:
[M]any	of	 the	accounts	 that	emerged	about	“before	 the	massacre”	and	
ordinary life demonstrate how the lives of women proceeded within 
practices	of	violent	masculine	domination.	 .	 .	 .	For	 them,	 the	“before”	
does	not	appear	to	have	been	an	idyll	of	peace	and	respect	for	their	rights	
in the domestic ambit.45 
43 For a more detailed exposition of this position see fIonnuala ní aoláIn, the polItICs of the forCe: 
ConflICt manaGement and state VIolenCe In northern Ireland	(2000).
44 ComIsIón naCIonal de reparaCIón y reConCIlIaCIón, Grupo de memoría hIstorICa, truJIllo: una 




between	 men	 and	 women	 and	 the	 negative	 constructions	 of	 masculinity	 and	










of international humanitarian law norms on non-state actors is complex and 
challenging.	The	Inter-American	system	is	generally	recognized	as	being	one	of	
the	most	sophisticated	human	rights	regimes	with	regard	to	its	acceptance	of	the	
relevance	of	humanitarian	 law	to	 the	 interpretation	of	human	rights,	as	well	as	
its	judicial	acceptance	that	in	some	of	the	countries	in	the	region,	humanitarian	
law	rather	than	human	rights	may	be	the	more	fitting	frame	of	reference.47	Both	
the	 Inter-American	 Commission	 and	 Court	 have	 endeavored	 to	 negotiate	 the	
appropriate	 exercise	 of	 their	 human	 rights	 mandate	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	
Colombian	 armed	 conflict.	 The	 Commission’s	 “bullish”48 attempts to enforce 
international	humanitarian	legal	norms	in	the	1990s	were	reined-in	by	the	Court	
in the Las Palmeras	decision,	in	which	the	Court	admitted	that	neither	it	nor	the	
Commission	was	 competent	 to	 apply	 the	Geneva	Conventions.49	Nevertheless,	
the	Court	held	that	both	bodies	are	competent	to	draw	on	the	Geneva	Conventions	






47	 James	L.	Cavallaro	&	Stephanie	Erin	Brewer,	Reevaluating Regional Human Rights Litigation in 
the Twenty-first Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court,	102	am. J. Int’l l.	768	(2008).
48	 This	 is	 the	 categorization	 of	 the	Commission’s	 approach	 in	 Lindsay	Moir,	Decommissioned? 





51 See, e.g., Mapiripán	Massacre	v.	Colombia,	Merits,	Reparations	and	Costs,	2005	Inter-Am.	Ct.	
H.R.	(ser.	C)	No.	134,	para.	155	(Sept.	15,	2005).	
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cover	 violations	 of	 humanitarian	 law	 by	 the	 non-state	 parties	 to	 the	 conflict.	
Accordingly,	the	Inter-American	Commission	decided	in	its	Third	Report	on	the	
Situation	 of	Human	Rights	 in	Colombia	 (1999)52	 that	 it	would	 not	 investigate	
or	hear	 individual	complaints	concerning	acts	by	armed	opposition	groups,	 for	
which the Colombian State is not responsible. 
The	 approach	 of	 the	 Commission	 to	 its	 broader	 country	 reporting	 is	
notably	 distinct	 from	 its	 methodology	 for	 reviewing	 individual	 petitions.	 The	
Commission	does	apply	IHL	to	armed	opposition	groups	in	its	country	reports.	
Country	 reporting	has	been	 framed	by	 reference	 to	 IHL	and	human	 rights	 law	
for	both	state	and	non-state	actors.	Although	this	methodology	does	not	suggest	
any	degree	of	equality	 in	accountability	and	responsibility	between	the	entities	






accountability (see below) and the use of humanitarian law as a measure in 
assessing	responsibilities	in	the	country-reporting	context. 
3.	The	Promise	of	Minimum	Humanitarian	Standards
In	 the	context	of	 internal	armed	conflicts	we	are	convinced	 that	 the	body	
of	 legal	 norms	 best	 placed	 to	 encompass	 the	 existing	 accountability	 gap	 is	
humanitarian	law.	In	our	view,	greater	acceptance	by	states	that	Common	Article	
3 provides a minimum set of standards by which the actions of both state and 
non-state	 actors	 should	 adhere	 would	 be	 a	 considerable	 advance	 in	 general,	
and provide many positives for women who experience violence in situations 
of	 internal	 armed	 conflict.	We	 appreciate	 that	 the	 explicit	 lack	 of	 recognition	
for	 gendered	 violations	 in	 Common	Article	 3	 is	 a	 limitation.	 Nonetheless,	 its	












some	minimal	set	of	legal	obligations	are	observed	by	all	parties.53 These codes 








Practically,	 how	 would	 the	 codes	 be	 activated?	 Gasser	 makes	 three	
observations	 on	 the	 threshold	 that	 should	 be	 met	 in	 order	 to	 trigger	 their	




characteristic of collective violence55	as	distinguishing	internal	disturbances	and	
tensions from other violent situations.56	In	this	sense,	we	believe	such	codes	can	






accept in practice (de facto) but not in law (de jure) that a situation of armed 
53	 Hans	Peter	Gasser, A Measure of Humanity in Internal Disturbances and Tensions: Proposal for a 
Code of Conduct, 28	Int’l reV. of the red Cross	38	(1988). Gasser	states	that	the	aim	of	such	rules	
is	to	reduce	human	suffering,	the	object	of	the	code	being	both	authorities	and	non-state	actors	
alike.
54 Id. at 41.
55	 The	ICRC	also	echos	this	theme	of	“collective	violence.”	The	President	of	the	ICRC	has	stated:
The	situation	of	 the	 individual	caught	up	 in	violence	 in	a	State,	violence	 that	
ranges	from	simple	 internal	 tensions	 to	more	serious	 internal	disturbances,	 is	
a	cause	of	deep	concern	to	the	ICRC.	A	suggestion	was	made	recently	to	draft	
a	 declaration	 of	 basic	 and	 inalienable	 rights	 applicable	 to	 cases	 of	 collective	
violence	within	 the	States,	 in	situations	 that	would	not	already	be	covered	by	
humanitarian law.
	 Alexander	Hay,	The ICRC and International Humanitarian Law, 23 Int’l reV. of the red Cross 
3, 9 (1984).









conflict	 exists.	Again,	 drawing	 on	 the	 Roots of War	 study,57 we endorse the 
position	that	normative	reference	points	are	critical	to	preventing	the	violation	
of	humanitarian	norms.	Moreover,	this	study	attests	that	in	situations	of	armed	
conflict,	 violations	 of	 IHL	 involve	 “social	 and	 individual	 processes	 of	 moral	
disengagement”	compounded	by	group	conformity	and	obedience	to	authority.58 
Where	 formal	application	of	 IHL	by	all	parties	may	prove	elusive,	agreement	







the	 influence	and	value	of	 soft	 law	deepens,	we	 should	not	underestimate	 the	
extent	to	which	minimum	standards	may	crystallize	and	become	“hard”	binding	
norms over time.







point of assessment is the normal levels of criminal activity as measured by 




becomes more complex as state discretion on what is termed criminal activity is 
exercised. 
It	is	nonetheless	significant	that	there	is	movement	towards	a	definition	of	
“internal	 disturbances	 and	 tensions”	 that	would	be	 sufficient	 to	 apply	 across	 a	
range	of	conflicts.	In	this	context,	we	emphasize	the	importance	of	including	the	
range	and	depth	of	violence	 experienced	by	women	as	part	 of	 the	 calculation.	






III. Imputed State Liability for the Violence of the Non-state Actor
The	key	issues	addressed	in	this	section	focus	on	the	means	by	which	the	
actions	 of	 the	 non-state	 actor	 can	 be	 captured	 by	 the	 legal	 obligations	 taken	
on by the State under international law. The concept and practices of imputed 
state	 liability	 are	 critical	 to	 addressing	 the	 degree	 and	 capacity	 for	 state	 legal	
obligations	to	capture	harms	committed	by	the	non-state	entity.	We	assess	these	
issues	by	focusing	on	violence	against	women	through	the	prism	of	disarmament,	
demobilization,	 and	 reintegration	 (DDR)	 processes	 that	 almost	 invariably	
accompany	the	post-conflict	process.
 A. DDR, the Post-Conflict Process, and Gendered Outcomes
The	Justice	and	Peace	process	has	given	rise	to	a	set	of	problems	in	Colombia	




the presence of women in combatant forces or the prominence of men in civilian 
populations,	there	is	nevertheless	an	often	unspoken	gender	piece	to	DDR:	namely,	
that	the	process	involves	the	reintegration	of	a	largely	male	(former)	combatant	
group	 into	a	disproportionately	 female	civilian	population.	By	and	 large,	DDR	
processes	are	directed	at	societies	in	which	there	have	been	significant	non-state	
sources	 of	 violence.	 The	 gender	 differential	 between	 returning	 and	 receiving	
communities	means	 that,	 although	DDR	 is	 officially	 concerned	with	 ensuring	









59 See, e.g.,	 U.N.	 Dep’t	 of	 Peacekeeping	 Operations,	 Lessons	 Learned	 Unit,	 Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles 
and Guidelines	 (2000);	 Mats	 R.	 Berdal,	 Int’l	 Inst.	 for	 Strategic	 Stud.,	 ADELPHI	 Paper	 303,	
Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the Termination of 
Armed Conflicts,	at	9	(1996);	KImberly mahlInG ClarK, usaId, fosterInG a farewell to arms: 
prelImInary lessons learned In the demobIlIzatIon and reInteGratIon of Combatants (1996); 
Mark	Knight,	Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former 





They	noted	 alarming	 increases	 in	 levels	 of	 domestic	 violence,	 as	 relationships	
were	 forged	 or	 reignited	 between	 former	 combatants	 and	 members	 of	 the	
civilian population.61	In	this	catalogue	of	harms	we	directly	confront	the	material	
consequences	 of	 the	 public/private	 distinction	 in	 transitional	 justice.	 Teenage	



















paramilitary violence and assassination.64	In	the	longer-term,	the	DDR	process	has	
been	criticized	by	women’s	organizations	for	institutionalizing	paramilitary	influence	
and	 power	within	 the	 demobilization	 zones,	 such	 as	Villavicencio,	 southeast	 of	
Bogotá.65	The	disarmament	process	was	highly	partial	and	largely	inadequate.	Large	
numbers	of	 the	demobilized	have	 returned	 to	 criminal	 activities.	One	 influential	
women’s	organization	concluded	that	the	ongoing	economic,	political,	and	military	
60 CorporaCIón humanas, rIesGos para la seGurIdad de las muJeres en proCesos de reInserCIón de 
exCombatIente: estudIo sobre el ImpaCto de la reInserCIón paramIlItar en la VIda y seGurIdad de 
las muJeres en los munICIpIos de montería y tIerralta departamento de Córdoba 67 (2005).
61 Id. at 73.




65 CorporaCIón humanas, muJeres entre mafIosos y señores de la Guerra: ImpaCto del proCeso de 






pregnancy	in	the	area).66 Criminal activities and the limitation of political expression 
fall more readily within the sphere of public harms in transitional justice. Evidence 
of	 public	 harms	 resulting	 from	DDR	 poses	 challenges	 to	 transitional	 justice	 in	
Colombia,	even	on	its	own	narrowly	stated	terms	of	ending	the	public	violence	of	
paramilitary	groups.	
These	 results	 require	 us	 to	 rethink	 the	 form	and	 terms	upon	which	DDR	




conflict	 is	 theoretically	ended	by	 the	state,	but	 the	non-state	actor	continues	 to	
exercise	violence,	albeit	now	in	the	theoretically	private	sphere	of	violence	against	
women	and	non-political	criminality,	where	does	legal	responsibility	lie?
 B. The Non-state Conundrum and the Feminist Response
The	posture	of	many	Colombian	women’s	organizations	toward	paramilitary	
forces	 reflects	 a	 more	 general	 posture	 of	 feminists	 towards	 non-state	 actors.	
The	non-state	actor	is	identified	as	masculine,	and	in	the	context	of	conflict	and	
repression	 as	 portraying	 hyper-masculine	 traits,67 as well as an inherent and 
unreformed	patriarchy	that	negatively	impacts	on	women.	The	non-state	actor	is	
viewed	as	unpredictable	and	unconstrained,	and	it	is	unclear	to	feminists	(as	it	is	to	
other	theoretical	approaches),68 how the non-state actor is to be held accountable 
for	his	actions,	specifically	as	they	affect	women.	This	lack	of	predictability	and	
stability	may	explain	feminist	unwillingness	to	expend	significant	theory,	policy,	
or advocacy attention to non-state entities.
Connectedly,	any	discussion	of	feminism	and	the	non-state	actor	mandates	
acknowledging	 the	 theorizing	 and	 policy	 that	 has	 emerged	 from	 women’s	
engagement	with	national	liberation	movements.	In	parallel,	the	status	of	women	
within,	 and	 the	 relationship	 of	 feminism	 to,	 national	 liberation	 movements	
has	seldom	led	 to	a	direct	 feminist	engagement	with	such	entities.69	 In	general	
66 Id.	at	52.
67 See Kimberly	Theidon,	Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
of Former Combatants in Colombia,	1	Int’l J. transItIonal Just. 66	(2007);	nIra yuVal-daVIs, 
Gender and natIon (1997).
68	 See,	for	example,	on	the	challenge	of	non-state	actors	to	traditional	approaches	to	security	studies,	
Steve	Smith,	The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last 
Twenty Years,	20	Contemp. seCurIty pol’y	72	(1999).
69	 See,	 for	 example,	 Gender and natIonal IdentIty: women and polItICs In muslIm soCIetIes 
(Valentine	M.	Moghadam	ed.,	1994).
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feminists	 have	 identified	 the	 complex	 paradox	 that	 frequently	 results	 from	
women’s	 involvement	 in	 national	 struggles.	 The	 involvement	 of	 women	 as	




that	 a	 reformist	 agenda	will	 transform	 such	movements.	As	 a	 result	 reformist	
attention	 remains	firmly	 focused	 on	 the	 state.	Notably	 the	 category	 of	women	
combatants (or even women as tacit supporters of violence) poses particular 




researched arenas across academic disciplines.73 




power	and	agency.”74 This blind spot tends to produce policy and practice that views 
women	as	 homogeneously	powerless	 or	 as	 implicit	 victims,	 thereby	 excluding	
the	parallel	reality	of	women	as	benefactors	of	oppression,	“or	the	perpetrators	
of	catastrophes.”75	Moreover,	women’s	active	roles	in	national	or	ethno-national	




70 See generally yuVal-daVIs, supra note 67.
71 See,	for	example,	Begoña	Aretxaga’s	work	on	women	and	nationalism	in	Northern	Ireland:	beGoña 
aretxaGa, shatterInG sIlenCe: women, natIonalIsm, and polItICal subJeCtIVIty In northern Ireland 
ix	(1997)	(“Women	are	the	backbone	of	the	struggle;	they	are	the	ones	carrying	the	war	here.”).
72 mIranda alIson, women and polItICal VIolenCe	1	(2008).





74	 Simona	Sharoni,	Rethinking Women’s Struggles in Israel-Palestine and in the North of Ireland,	in 
VICtIms, perpetrators or aCtors? Gender, armed ConflICt and polItICal VIolenCe	86	(Caroline	
Moser	&	Fiona	Clark	eds.,	2001).
75 ronIt lentIn, Gender and Catastrophe 12 (1997).
76 See yuVal-daVIs, supra	note	59.	See	also	the	assessment	of	the	position	of	the	20,000	odd	women	
who	fought	 in	 the	Marxist	Eritrean	People’s	Liberation	Front,	whose	return	back	 into	a	deeply	
patriarchal	society	has	been	fraught	on	numerous	 levels,	James	C.	McKinley,	Eritrea’s Women 
Fighters Long for Equality of War,	the GuardIan,	May	6,	1995.	
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and the status of women in postcolonial states77	bears	out	Cynthia	Enloe’s	assertion	
that	national	 liberation	movements	 tend	 to	adopt	a	position	of	“not	now,	 later”	









But,	 in	 simple	 terms	 of	 numerical	 presence,	 women	 remain	 vastly	 under-
represented within the state;79 and empirical research demonstrates the cross-
regional	 truth	 that	women’s	political	activity	 is	concentrated	within	 local	civil	
society	organization.80	Nevertheless,	for	women’s	movements	seeking	to	make	
political	gains,	their	advocacy	is	remarkable	consistent	in	targeting	the	state.	We	
do not doubt the value and importance of that endeavor. The state is and will 









 C. Due Diligence as a Method to Influence the Non-state Actor






Campbell,	Gender and Post-Conflict Civil Society,	7	 Int’l fem. J. pol.	377	(2005);	luz maría 
londoño f. & yoana fernanda nIeto V., muJeres no Contadas: proCesos de demoVIlIzaCIón y 
retorno a la VIda CIVIl de muJeres exCombatIentes en ColombIa 1990-2003 (2007).
78 CynthIa enloe, the mornInG after: sexual polItICs at the end of the Cold war	(1993).
79	 See,	for	example,	the	number	of	women	in	the	parliaments	of	the	world,	available	at	the	website	of	
the	Inter-Parliamentarian	Union,	http://www.ipu.org.	





















extension of state responsibility to non-state actors for public harms; and due 
diligence	analysis	applied	to	private	harms	as	discrimination.
1.	 Capturing	Gender-based	Violence




punishment,	 and	 eradication	 of	 violence	 against	 women.82 The Convention 
includes a mechanism for the communication of individual complaints to the 
Inter-American	Commission.83	While	 the	 Inter-American	Court	 has	 been	more	
conservative	 in	 its	 jurisprudential	development	of	women’s	 rights	 to	 live	 from	
free	from	violence,84	recent	decisions	signal	an	important	new	trajectory.
The	 2006	 decision	 concerning	 the	 sexual	 abuse	 of	 women	 detainees	 in	
the	 Peruvian	Miguel	 Castro-Castro	 prison	 has	 set	 an	 important	 marker	 in	 the	
81 See	 Rebecca	Cook,	Accountability in International Law for Violations of Women’s Rights by 
Non-State Actors,	25	stud. transnat’l leGal pol’y	93	(1993).
82	 Inter-American	 Convention	 for	 the	 Prevention,	 Punishment,	 and	 Eradication	 of	 Violence 
Against	Women,	“Convention	of	Belem	do	Para”,	June	9,	1994,	33	ILM	1534,	entered into force 
Mar.	5,	1995.
83 Id.	art.	12.	
84 See Patricia	Palacios	Zuloaga,	The Path to Gender Justice in the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights,	17	tex. J. women & l. 228	(2008).
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recognition	of	gender-specific	forms	of	inhuman	treatment.85	Acts	such	as	being	
surrounded	by	 security	 forces	while	 required	 to	 strip	 and	 remain	naked	 for	 an	
extended	 period,	 being	 prohibited	 from	 showering,	 being	 accompanied	 to	 the	
bathroom	 by	 male	 guards,	 and	 denial	 of	 post-partum	medical	 attention,	 were	









argued	 that	 the	 communications	 alleging	 violations	 of	 rights	 guaranteed	 under	
the	 Convention	 could	 only	 be	 considered	 by	 the	 Inter-American	 Commission,89 
the	Court	found	the	State	in	violation	of	its	Article	7(b)	obligation	to	investigate	
and	punish	violence	against	women.	Read	together,	these	different	aspects	of	the	
Court’s	 decision	 reiterate	 states’	 duty	 to	 prevent,	 punish,	 and	 eradicate	 violence	
against	women;	to	investigate	allegations	of	torture,	including	gender-based	forms	












Here	 the	Court’s	 jurisprudence	 has	 specifically	 addressed	 the	Colombian	
State’s	 liability	 for	 human	 rights	 violations	 perpetrated	by	paramilitary	 groups	
85	 Miguel	Castro-Castro	Prison	v.	Peru,	2006	Inter-Am.	Ct.	H.R.	(ser.	C)	No.	160	(Nov.	25,	2006).
86 Id.	para.	197.
87 Id. para. 347.
88 Id.	para.	432.
89 Id.	para.	379.





paramilitary	 and	 political	 activities	 of	 the	 paramilitaries	 continue	 today,93 and 
the	 Inter-American	Court	 has	 held	 the	Colombian	State	 accountable	 for	many	
of	 the	most	 serious	 public	 harms	 of	 the	 paramilitaries	 which	 occurred	 during	
the	conflict.	For	example,	in	the	Mapiripán Massacre	case,	the	Court	found	the	
Colombian	State	responsible	for	the	abductions,	torture,	and	killings	committed	
by	 the	paramilitary	or	self-defense	groups,	due	 to	 the	“link	between	the	armed	
forces	and	 this	paramilitary	group	 to	commit	 the	massacre	 .	 .	 .	 conducted	 in	a	
coordinated,	parallel	or	 linked	manner.”94	This	 linkage	allied	with	an	emphasis	
on	 due	 diligence	 remains	 critical	 to	 the	 protection	 of	 women	 in	 situations	 of	
armed	conflict.	The	Court’s	decision	in	the	Mapiripán Massacre case can be read 






women	 is	 the	public/private	 divide	 and	how	 that	 intersects	with	 the	 state/non-
state	 paradigm.	The	 implications	 for	women	 of	 the	 public/private	 divide	 have	
been well documented by feminist scholars.95	 Law’s	 oversight	 of	 the	 private	
domain	 is	 purposely	 constrained,	 and	 that	 deemed	 private	 remains	 effectively	
out-of-regulatory-bounds.	The	difficulties	of	the	public/private	divide	applied	to	
the	state	and	non-state	continuum	are	to	some	degree	self-evident.	Regarding	the	










93 GustaVo dunCan,	los señores de la Guerra: de paramIlItares, mafIosos y autodefensas en 
ColombIa	(2006).
94 Mapiripán,	supra	note	92,	para.	123.
95	 Feminist	 theorists	have	long	articulated	that	 the	most	pervasive	harms	to	women	tend	to	occur	
within	the	inner	sanctum	of	the	private	realm,	within	the	family.	See sally enGle merry, human 







failure to respond appropriately to forms of private violence that are experienced 




to live free from all forms of violence in the Campo Algodonero case.98 The Court 
for	the	first	time	found	a	state	in	violation	of	its	affirmative	obligations	to	respond	
to	 violence	 against	women	 by	 private	 actors.	The	 decision	 concerned	 three	 in	
a	series	of	hundreds	of	unsolved	and	poorly	investigated	disappearances,	rapes,	
and	murders	 of	 young	women	 in	 Ciudad	 Juarez	 on	 the	 U.S.-Mexican	 border.	
Significantly,	the	Court	considered	the	human	rights	violations	in	Mexico	within	








women.100 Mexico was ordered to comply with a broad set of remedial measures 
including	a	national	memorial,	 renewed	 investigations,	and	 reparations	of	over	
$200,000	each	to	the	families	in	the	suit.101 




context. This comprehensive and contextual approach to state complicity in 
perpetuating	violence	against	women	by	private	actors	should	draw	attention	and	
legal	responsibility	to	the	relationship	between	the	State’s	role	in	negotiating	the	
97 See, e.g.,	AT	v.	Hungary,	(Communication	No.	2/2003),	Views of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women under article 7, paragraph 3, of the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women	 (Jan.	26,	2005);	
Andrew	Byrnes	&	Eleanor	Bath,	Violence against Women, the Obligation of Due Diligence, and 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,	8	
hum. rts. l. reV.	517	(2008).









identified	 goes	 beyond	 the	 abductions,	 torture,	 and	 killings	 by	 paramilitaries	
addressed in the Mapiripán	case,	the	Colombian	State	has	clear	legal	obligations	
to	prevent,	protect,	investigate,	punish,	and	compensate	for	the	full	range	of	public	
and	private	harms	experienced	by	women	within	the	demilitarization	zones.	
Conclusion: Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, and 
Re-calibrating State Interests in the Negotiation of Transitional Justice
As	we	conclude	this	chapter	we	come	back	to	the	point	at	which	the	issues	
of	 accountability	 are	 most	 squarely	 on	 the	 table	 (or	 clearly	 absent	 from	 the	
table)—namely	 at	 the	 point	 of	 negotiation	 between	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors.	
While	a	peace	deal	may	transform	relations	between	violent	actors,	it	will	likely	
do	very	little	for	social	relations	within	the	zones	controlled	by	particular	groups	
of	violent	actors.	A	peace	deal	may	also	do	very	 little	 to	 resolve	 the	 legal	and	
structural	 ambiguities	 that	 pervade	 prior	 and	 continuing	 overlapping	 regimes	
of	control	 that	have	characterized	 the	conflicted	non-state	and	state	zones.	The	
constructive	 ambiguity	 of	 the	 peace	 deal	may	 in	 fact	 incorporate	 that	 tension	
and	reality	directly	into	new	arrangements.102	In	Colombia,	the	DDR	process	is	
widely	attributed	with	legitimating	paramilitary	social	control,	rather	than	ending	
it.103	Moreover	 it	 is	 seen	as	giving	 rise	 to	 concern	 that	 the	de	 facto	black	hole	
of	accountability	created	by	the	paramilitaries	has	been	institutionalized	by	the	












102	 Chrisitine	Bell	&	Kathleeen	Cavaunaugh,	Constructive Ambiguity or Internal Self-Determination? 
Self-Determination, Group Accommodation and the Belfast Agreement,	 22	fordham Int’l L.J.	
1345	(1999).

























by	 paramilitary	 actors	 could	 mean	 that	 the	 material	 and	 symbolic	 benefits	 of	
inclusion	 (within	 the	 state)	 would,	 in	 a	 meaningful	 way,	 be	 made	 subject	 to	
principles	 of	 non-violence	 and	non-discrimination	 against	women.	 In	 sum,	we	
urge	greater	attention	to	the	non-state	actor	and	greater	attention	to	the	capacity	of	
human	rights	and	humanitarian	law,	as	well	as	transitional	“deals,”	to	hold	such	
actors	accountable	for	gendered	harms	committed	during	armed	conflict.
